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EFFECTS OF LABOR TAXES
MINCHUL YUM
University of Mannheim
A higher labor tax rate increases the equilibrium real interest rate and reduces the
equilibrium wage in a heterogeneous-agent model with endogenous savings and
indivisible labor supply decisions. I show that these general equilibrium (GE)
adjustments, in particular of the real interest rate, reinforce the negative employment
impact of higher labor taxes. However, the representative-agent version of the model,
which generates similar aggregate employment responses to labor tax changes, implies
that GE feedback is neutral. The cross-country panel data reveal that the negative
association between labor tax rates and the extensive margin labor supply is significantly
and robustly weaker in small open economies where the interest rate is less tightly linked
to domestic circumstances. This empirical evidence supports the transmission mechanism
of labor tax changes for employment in the heterogeneous-agent model.
Keywords: Labor Income Tax, Labor Supply Elasticity, General Equilibrium,
Cross-Country Panel
1. INTRODUCTION
The goal of this paper is to explore general equilibrium (GE) feedback regarding
the employment effects of labor tax changes. The degree to which labor taxes
affect employment and aggregate hours worked is central to various questions in
economics.1 Although recent studies of aggregate labor supply in the macroe-
conomics literature increasingly adopt richer and more realistic models, little
attention has been given to the role of GE feedback.2 GE considerations are often
assumed away by exogenously setting a fixed interest rate (so-called a small open
economy assumption) or fixed wages in partial equilibrium settings. This paper
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fills this void and intends to enhance the understanding of GE channels through
which labor taxes affect employment.
I first conduct a quantitative theoretical analysis based on (i) a heterogeneous-
agent model with indivisible labor supply and incomplete asset markets, built
upon Chang and Kim (2006) and Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) and (ii)
its representative-agent counterpart [Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988)]. The
main finding is that the transmission mechanism through which labor tax changes
affect employment in the two economies differs sharply, despite similar aggre-
gate employment responses to labor tax changes.3 Specifically, GE feedback
with respect to labor tax changes reinforces negative employment responses in
the heterogeneous-agent model, whereas it plays no role in the representative-
agent model. A novel contribution of this paper is the emphasis on the role of
the equilibrium interest rate that is found to be quantitatively relevant in ampli-
fying the negative employment impact of labor taxes. In particular, despite the
fact that labor tax changes lead to seemingly small changes in the real interest
rate, I find that these interest rate changes affect aggregate employment quite sub-
stantially, increasing the long-run labor supply elasticity from 0.18 to 0.34 in the
heterogeneous-agent model.4
I show that this GE feedback can be traced to the heterogeneous behavior
of households. Specifically, in the heterogeneous-agent model, the labor sup-
ply behavior of households with high productivity is nearly inelastic to labor
tax changes, whereas their savings behavior is very much affected by labor tax
changes.5 As a result, the aggregate efficiency unit of labor falls relatively less
than other macroeconomic aggregates, including aggregate capital stock, with
respect to higher labor taxes. This leads to lower equilibrium wages and higher
equilibrium interest rates, both of which tend to reinforce the negative impact
of labor taxes on employment. Note that this mechanism emphasizes GE feed-
back resulting from interactions between the labor market and the capital (or
asset) market, in contrast to conventional GE considerations, which focus on
market-clearing wages within labor markets.
I also conduct an empirical analysis to test the novel implication of the
heterogeneous-agent model relative to the representative-agent model: interest
rate adjustments matter for the employment effects of labor taxes. As the interest
rate in small open economies (SOEs) is less tightly linked to domestic circum-
stances, a testable implication of the theory is whether the negative employment
impact of higher labor taxes is weaker or not among SOEs, compared to non-
SOEs. Using a fairly large cross-country panel data set, I first document that
the negative relationship between the labor tax rate and the extensive margin
labor supply is considerably flatter among SOEs. Moreover, labor supply elastic-
ities, estimated from panel regressions in the spirit of Prescott (2004) and Chetty
et al. (2012), show that the elasticity among SOEs is significantly lower than that
among non-SOEs, which is in line with the transmission mechanism of labor tax
changes on aggregate employment in the heterogeneous-agent model.
This paper builds on the literature that compares the aggregate labor supply
implications of heterogeneous-agent models compared to representative-agent
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models.6 As in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) and Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson
(2010), my paper also confirms that household heterogeneity per se may
not be crucial in terms of aggregate employment responsiveness to labor tax
changes. However, my paper is distinguished from the existing studies in car-
rying out decomposition of aggregate employment changes and in highlighting
the role of GE feedback explicitly. Further, my paper also conducts an empir-
ical analysis using cross-country panel data, providing empirical support for
the heterogeneous-agent model over the representative-agent model unlike the
aforementioned papers.
In the next section, I describe the environment of the model economies.
Section 3 presents calibration, and Section 4 presents the main quantitative anal-
ysis. Section 5 explores empirical evidence related to the findings in Section 4.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. MODEL ECONOMIES
This section describes two model economies used for the quantitative theoreti-
cal analysis in the following sections. The two model economies share the same
economic environment such as the production sector, government sector, and the
indivisibility of labor supply, but differ in terms of household heterogeneity.
2.1. Heterogeneous-Agent Model
I first present the heterogeneous-agent model, which is a standard GE model with
incomplete markets [Imrohoroğlu (1989), Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994)].
Households. There is a continuum of infinitely lived households who differ in
their asset holdings a and productivity x in each period. A household decides
how much to consume c and save for the next period a′. The productivity
x ∈ {x1, x2, . . . , xNx} follows a Markov chain with transition probabilities {πij}Nxi,j=1,
where πij ≡ Pr(x′j|xi). This idiosyncratic uncertainty cannot be fully insured
because a is the only asset available to households. Labor supply is endogenous
at the extensive margin [Rogerson (1988) and Chang and Kim (2006)]. The com-
petitive factor markets imply that households take as given the wage rate per
efficiency unit of labor w and the real interest rate r. Households also take as
given the labor income tax τl, capital income tax τk, and transfers T .
The functional equation summarizing the decision problem of households is
given by V (a, xi) = max{W(a, xi), N(a, xi)}, where the value of working, W(a, xi),
and the value of non-working, N(a, xi), are defined as
W(a, xi) = max
a′≥a,
⎧⎨







s.t. c + a′ ≤ (1 − τl)wxih̄ + (1 + r(1 − τkI(a > 0)))a + T(·),
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N(a, xi) = max
a′≥a,
⎧⎨







s.t. c + a′ ≤ (1 + r(1 − τkI(a > 0)))a + T(·).
Households face budget constraints: the sum of current consumption and asset
demands for the next period should not be greater than the sum of net-of-tax
labor income (1 − τl)wxih̄ (if they choose to work), current asset holdings a,
net-of-tax capital income r(1 − τk)a, and transfers according to the schedule T(·).
I(a > 0) is an indicator function such that capital income tax is only imposed
when a is positive. Households can borrow up to the limit a ≤ 0. If households
choose to work, they earn labor income in return for disutility h̄ where  is




′, x′j) is discounted by a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
Firm. There is a representative firm that produces aggregate output Y . Production
technology is captured by a standard constant-returns-to-scale production func-
tion F(K, L), where the factors of production include capital K and aggregate
efficiency units of labor L. The competitive firm takes prices, r and w, as given
and solves the following profit maximization problem:
max
K,L
{F(K, L) − (r + δ)K − wL} ,
where δ is the depreciation rate. As is standard in the literature, a Cobb–Douglas
function is used for production technology: F(K, L) = KαL1−α .
Government. There is a government which levies proportional income taxes on
labor τl and capital τk. Using the collected tax revenues, the government provides
transfers T(·) and spends G while balancing its budget each period.
Although the focus of this paper is not on government transfers, it is impor-
tant to introduce transfers in order to match the wealth gradient of employment
rates in this class of models [Yum (2018)]. Following Krusell and Rios-Rull
(1999), I assume that transfers consist of two components: T = T1 + T2, where
T1 is given to all households equally and T2 is the income security compo-
nent. Then, T2 is allowed to be progressive following the functional form:
T2(x) = ω0 exp(−ω1x). Note that there are two parameters shaping T2. The first
parameter ω0 ≥ 0 is a scale parameter. When ω0 becomes higher, the second
component of transfers T2 becomes relatively larger. The second parameter
ω1 ≥ 0 captures the progressivity of the transfer system. A higher ω1 implies
that T2 decreases faster with productivity. As shown in Section 3, this parsimo-
nious progressive transfer structure allows the model to successfully replicate
the observed progressivity of government transfers across wealth quintiles.
Government purchase G is determined to balance the period government budget
constraint.7
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Equilibrium. A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of factor prices, w, r,
aggregate allocations, K, L, household’s decision rules g(a, x), h(a, x), value func-
tions V (a, x), W(a, x), N(a, x), government policy variables τl, τk, T(·), G, and the
distribution of households over the individual state space μ(a, x) such that
1. Given factor prices w, r, the value functions V (a, x), W(a, x), N(a, x) solve the
household’s decision problems, and g(a, x), h(a, x) are the associated decision rules.
2. Given factor prices w, r, the firm optimally chooses Kd and Ld following




















xih(a, xi)μ(da, xi) = Ld = L. (4)












5. The distribution of households is stationary: μ(a′, x′) implied by g(a, x), h(a, x),
{πij}Nxi,j=1 and μ(a, x) is again μ(a, x).
2.2. Representative-Agent Model
This subsection presents the representative-agent counterpart of the
heterogeneous-agent model introduced in the previous subsection. Since
the only difference between the two models is in the household sector, I describe
the household sector of this representative-agent economy.
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households whose
productivity is homogeneous. I maintain the same assumption that labor supply
is indivisible at the individual level; that is, each household can supply either 0
or h̄ hours of work. Following the aggregation theory in Rogerson (1988), one
can show that the stand-in household period utility function has a key feature that
disutility of work is linear in employment.8
The stand-in household’s dynamic problem in this representative-agent model
is written as




log C − E + V (K′)}
subject to C + K′ ≤ (1 − τl)wE + (1 + r(1 − τk))K + T ,
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where the household chooses the optimal consumption C (or savings K′) and
the optimal fraction of the employed E ∈ [0, 1]. The remaining elements such
as taxes τl, τk and transfers T (in terms of size) are identical to those in
the heterogeneous-agent model. The steady-state competitive equilibrium of
this representative-agent model can be solved analytically (see Supplementary
Appendix).
3. CALIBRATION
The model economies are calibrated to US data. A model period is a year. There
are two sets of parameters. The first set is chosen externally and is common
between the heterogeneous-agent model and the representative-agent model. The
second set of parameters is determined internally to make the model behave sim-
ilarly in terms of several key statistics obtained from the 2005 Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) with the Supplemental Wealth File and the 2001 Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).9
Parameters calibrated externally. Most of the parameters calibrated externally
are commonly used in the quantitative macroeconomics literature, and their values
are set following Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010). The first parameter α is set
to 0.36, consistent with the capital share in the aggregate US data. The annual
capital depreciation rate δ is equal to 0.096. The baseline tax rate on labor income
τl is equal to 0.3, as in other related studies [Krusell et al. (2008, 2010), and
Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010)].10 I set τk equal to 0.38, which is in between
the values in Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). The
parameter for the full-time hours of work, h̄, is set to 0.407.
The Markov chain, {xi}Nxi=1 and {πij}Nxi,j=1, in the heterogeneous-agent model is
assumed to approximate a continuous AR(1) process, log x′ = ρ log x + ε′, where
ε is normally distributed with mean zero and the standard deviation of σx, follow-
ing Rouwenhorst (1995). The two parameters ρx and σx are set to 0.94 and 0.205,
as in Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010).
Parameters calibrated internally. The remaining parameters are jointly cali-
brated to match the same number of target statistics. In the heterogeneous-agent
model, these parameter values are determined as minimizers of the distance
between the relevant statistics from US data and those from the model-generated
data. In the representative-agent model, I use the equations that characterize the
steady-state equilibrium to calibrate these parameters.
The first parameter in Table 1 is β, which is the discount factor. This parameter
is calibrated to match the steady-state real interest rate of 4%. Next,  is the
parameter capturing the disutility of work. The relevant target is the aggregate
employment rate. According to the 2005 PSID, this ratio is 77.6%, which is used
as another target statistic. Finally, a is the borrowing limit, which is relevant for
the heterogeneous-agent model. The target statistic for this parameter is set as
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TABLE 1. Parameters chosen internally using simulation
Model
Parameter HA RA Target statistics
β 0.9649 0.9758 Steady-state interest rate
 1.575 0.9317 Employment rate
a −0.183 – Share of wealth by 1st quintile
T1 0.0504 0.142 Flat transfers–output ratio
ω0 0.355 – Progressive transfers–output ratio
ω1 3.26 – Progressivity of transfer schedule
the share of wealth among the first wealth quintile (−1.1%) in the same PSID
data set.
The next three parameters govern the government transfer system. Recall that
the parameter T1 determines the size of flat government transfers, whereas ω0
determines the size of progressive transfers. Since these two components can be
distinguished in the heterogeneous-agent model, their relevant target statistics are
set to be 6.8% and 3.8% of output, respectively [Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999)].
On the other hand, the representative-agent model, which lacks heterogeneity,
cannot incorporate progressivity. Therefore, ω0 is irrelevant and T1 is directly
calibrated to match an aggregate transfers–output ratio of 10.6%. In the USA,
the presence of various means-tested programs leads to the fact that the poor
households receive a substantially larger amount of transfers related to income
security. The parameter ω1, which shapes the progressivity of T2, is calibrated to
match the relative size of income security transfers going to the households in the
bottom wealth quintile compared to its unconditional mean (2.36).11
Although not reported, all model specifications with the reported calibrated
values can match the target statistics precisely. In addition, by construction, all of
the model specifications have the same capital–output ratio (2.65).
Distributional properties of the heterogeneous-agent model. In the
heterogeneous-agent model, the distribution of wealth is an endogenous object.
Thus, I check how the heterogeneous-agent model performs in terms of non-
targeted moments across the distribution of wealth. The first row in Table 2 shows
the wealth share by each wealth quintile in the USA. The first two rows show that
the heterogeneous-agent model does a good job of matching the distribution of
wealth in the data. In particular, the model implies that the top wealth quintile
holds close to 76% of the total wealth, which is close to 79% in the data.
Table 2 also reports employment rates by wealth quintile. In US data, employ-
ment rates by wealth quintile are relatively flat or slightly inverse U-shaped.
Specifically, the employment is relatively low among the bottom wealth quin-
tile (69%) and is quite flat around 82% in the second to fourth wealth quintiles.
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TABLE 2. Disaggregated statistics by wealth quintile: data and model
Wealth quintile
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Wealth share (%)
Data (PSID) −1.1 1.0 5.3 16.5 78.6
HA model −1.1 0.2 5.1 19.8 75.9
Employment rate (%)
Data (PSID) 68.8 81.1 83.3 82.3 72.8
HA model 71.7 90.7 85.0 76.1 64.5
T2 relative to E(T2)
Data (SIPP) 2.36 1.36 0.72 0.34 0.21
HA model 2.36 1.05 0.69 0.53 0.37
Note: The distributional statistics in the USA are obtained from the 2005 PSID with Supplemental Wealth
File and 2001 SIPP.
Then, the employment rate among the top wealth quintile is lower at 73%. The
heterogeneous-agent model which incorporates progressive transfers and capi-
tal taxation does an excellent job of matching the employment rates by wealth
quintile [Yum (2018)].
Finally, the last two rows in Table 2 show the conditional mean of T2 in
each wealth quintile relative to the unconditional mean of T2. Note that although
the calibration only targets the first wealth quintile (2.36), the functional form
assumed in Section 2.1 does a good job of accounting for the observed degree of
progressivity in income-security programs in the USA.
4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS USING MODEL ECONOMIES
This section presents the main quantitative-theoretic analysis using the calibrated
model economies.
4.1. Employment Response to Labor Tax Changes in Model Economies
I begin by presenting equilibrium employment responses with respect to changes
in the labor tax rate τl in the model economies [e.g., Krusell et al. (2008, 2010),
Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), and Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010)]. In
doing so, I consider two cases given that a change in τl affects the government
budget constraint (5). The first case assumes that G is adjusted to balance the
government budget while holding T fixed. I consider this case as the baseline in
the next subsection because this assumption simplifies the decomposition exer-
cise by muting additional feedback effects from a change in T . However, in the
current subsection, I also consider the second case in which T is adjusted (in
the heterogeneous-agent model, T1 and T2 are adjusted in the same proportion)
while holding G fixed. This assumption allows for feedback through T because a
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TABLE 3. Labor taxes and employment rates in the USA and in Europe
Employment rates
By wealth quintile
Unit: % In aggregate First Second Third Fourth Fifth
HA model: τl = 0.45
G adjusts (holding T fixed) 70.7 62.6 83.2 78.2 71.9 57.8
T adjusts (holding G fixed) 61.9 49.1 68.4 69.6 66.3 56.1
Data (HFCS)
France 60.7 46.2 72.3 70.7 59.7 54.6
Germany 62.3 44.3 59.6 72.4 72.1 63.3
Italy 53.3 49.4 61.2 50.9 52.6 52.6
Note: Employment rates by wealth quintile in European countries are computed by the author using samples from
the Eurosystem Household Finance and Consumption Survey.
higher tax would increase T , which in turn has negative income effects on labor
supply.
Table 3 first shows the equilibrium employment responses with respect to
τl = 0.45, implied by the heterogeneous-agent model. It shows employment
changes both in aggregate and by wealth quintile. Given that the labor tax rate
of 45% is close to the tax rate in continental European countries such as France,
Germany, and Italy, it is interesting to investigate how the model accounts
for not only aggregate employment but also employment rates across wealth
distribution. First, note that, in line with Prescott (2004), Ohanian et al. (2008),
and Rogerson (2008), I find that labor taxes in my heterogeneous-agent model
can largely account for the difference in the aggregate employment level between
the USA and European countries, especially when T is adjusted accordingly.
More importantly, my model implies that the employment rate by wealth quintile
features a clear inverse U-shape when τl is set to be 45%. The last three rows in
Table 3 show that this shape is very close to its counterpart in France, Germany,
and Italy, constructed using samples from the Eurosystem’s Household Finance
and Consumption Survey. This highlights that the heterogeneous-agent model
is able to account for not only the aggregate employment pattern but also
distributional aspects in employment.
Table 4 presents the employment rate as a function of net-of-tax rates for a
range of labor tax rates, implied by both the heterogeneous-agent model and
the representative-agent model.12 The first thing to note is that both models pre-
dict sizeable effects of labor taxes on aggregate employment, especially when T
adjusts. More importantly, given the same fiscal responses, two models gener-
ate similar aggregate employment responses to labor tax changes, confirming the
near-equivalence result in terms of aggregate employment responses between the
heterogeneous-agent model and the representative-agent model in the literature.13
In addition to Table 4, the following regression provides a more concrete num-
ber (i.e., the labor supply elasticity) that measures the degree of employment
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TABLE 4. Labor taxes and aggregate employment in model economies
τl = 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
G adjusts (holding T fixed)
HA model 105.7 104.0 102.1 100.0 97.0 94.1 91.2
RA model 106.0 104.2 102.2 100.0 97.5 94.5 91.2
T adjusts (holding G fixed)
HA model 116.6 112.7 106.6 100.0 93.1 86.1 79.8
RA model 117.8 111.9 105.9 100.0 94.1 88.1 82.2
Note: Reported numbers are relative to the benchmark case with the labor income tax rate of 30% for each
specification (normalized to 100).
responsiveness to net-of-tax changes in percentage term [e.g., Chetty et al.
(2012)]:
log E = β0 + β1 log(1 − τl) + ε, (6)
where E refers to employment. The estimate of β1 is 0.347 in the heterogeneous-
agent model and it is 0.353 in the representative-agent model when G adjusts
holding T fixed. In the case when T adjusts holding G fixed, it is 0.898 in the
heterogeneous-agent model and 0.827 in the representative-agent model. These
similar slope estimates clearly demonstrate that household heterogeneity may not
be crucial at least when it comes to aggregate employment responsiveness to labor
tax changes.
4.2. Decomposing Equilibrium Employment Changes
I now move on to the main question of this paper: transmission channels through
which labor tax changes affect aggregate employment. Note that even if the aggre-
gate employment responses are similar, the underlying transmission channels
could differ substantially. An equilibrium aggregate employment response with
























Specifically, an equilibrium change in employment (dE) with respect to a change
in the labor tax (dτl) can be decomposed into several components. The first term
on the right-hand side captures the employment change driven directly by labor
tax changes while holding fixed equilibrium changes such as the wage and real
interest rate. Because changes in labor taxes could influence equilibrium factor
prices, the equilibrium employment change can be affected additionally by the
second part (GE effects)—the sum of employment changes caused by changes in
wage w and real interest rate r. It should be noted that each GE effect can be either
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Notes: The figure is based on the assumption that G adjusts with respect to a change in the labor tax.
The solid line is the equilibrium employment responses to tax changes in GE. The dashed line is the
direct response while holding factor prices fixed at the baseline level with a tax rate of 0.3. The dotted
line refers to the employment responses to tax changes when, on top of the direct effects, equilib-
rium wage adjustments are accounted for. The long-dashed line captures the effects when equilibrium
interest rate changes are accounted for.
FIGURE 1. Decomposition of employment changes in the heterogeneous-agent model.








). In other words, GE feedback may reinforce or dampen the negative effects
of labor taxes on employment.
As for the decomposition in the heterogeneous-agent model, a graphical pre-
sentation of the results is useful. In Figure 1, I first plot the changes in employment
solely based on direct effects (dashed line) and the equilibrium effect (solid
line).15 It is clear that the heterogeneous-agent model that produces sizable
employment responses to labor taxes in GE predicts substantially weaker direct
employment responses. A natural question that follows is the source of this size-
able gap. Figure 1 also plots the employment responses incorporating not only
the direct effect but also effects induced by an additional channel one by one:
(i) the wage channel (dotted line) and (ii) the interest rate channel (long-dashed









is positive but quantitatively small. Second, adding








brings the employment effects notice-
ably closer to the equilibrium effect, showing that adjustments in the interest rate
reinforce the direct employment response to labor taxes considerably.
In the case of the representative-agent model, this decomposition is trivial due
to the following results. The proofs are in Supplementary Appendix.
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TABLE 5. Contributions of GE channels
Labor supply elasticity
G adjusts T adjusts
HA model RA model HA model RA model
Equilibrium response 0.347 0.353 0.898 0.827
Direct response (w, r, T fixed) 0.177 0.353 0.177 0.353
Direct response + wage channel 0.189 0.353 0.190 0.353
(+0.013) (0.000) (+0.013) (0.000)
Direct response + interest channel 0.339 0.353 0.398 0.353
(+0.162) (0.000) (+0.221) (0.000)
Notes: Reported values are the implied labor supply elasticity with respect to permanent tax changes. Numbers in
the parentheses are the size of the elasticity relative to the counterpart in the second row (direct response).





in the representative-agent model
is independent of τl across steady states.
PROPOSITION 2. The equilibrium wage and interest rate in the
representative-agent model are independent of τl.
Because the equilibrium factor prices are a function of the capital-to-labor ratio





= 0). According to (7), this implies that the equilibrium effects of labor
taxes in the representative-agent model are solely due to the direct effects.
To summarize the decomposition exercises above, Table 5 reports the estimates
of the labor supply elasticity using model-generated data from the heterogeneous-
agent model and the representative-agent model. Despite the similar elasticities
in the first row based on the GE responses, the second row reveals that the direct
responses that hold prices fixed are substantially weaker in the heterogeneous-
agent model. Table 5 also reports the difference in the contribution of each GE
channel.16 First, note that adding each of the GE channels reinforces the direct
employment response in the heterogeneous-agent model since the increments are
all positive while GE feedback plays no role in the representative-agent model.
Second, in the heterogeneous-agent model, adjustments of equilibrium interest
rates are quantitatively much more significant in amplifying the elasticity (ranging
from +0.16 to +0.22) than equilibrium wage adjustments (around +0.01).
4.3. Inspecting the Transmission Mechanism
This subsection investigates in detail the transmission mechanism quantified in
the previous subsection. According to (7), the sign and magnitude of GE feedback
driven by equilibrium price changes can be traced back to the two separate terms:





, and (ii) changes in employment with respect to changes in wages and interest
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TABLE 6. Equilibrium effects of labor taxes in the heterogeneous-agent model
τl = 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
Equilibrium prices
w (% dev) 1.02 0.70 0.36 0.0 −0.36 −0.76 −1.18
r (pp dev) −0.24 −0.17 −0.09 0.0 0.09 0.19 0.29
Aggregate allocations
K (% dev) 5.8 4.0 2.1 0.0 −2.4 −5.0 −7.7
L (% dev) 2.9 2.0 1.1 0.0 −1.4 −3.0 −4.6
E (% dev) 5.7 4.0 2.1 0.0 −3.0 −5.9 −8.8
Notes: This table is based on the assumption that G adjusts with respect to a change in the labor tax. The unit of
reported values in the second row is a percentage point deviation relative to the baseline model with a tax rate of 0.3,










both zero (Proposition 2), implying that decomposition is trivial. Therefore, the
analysis of this subsection focuses on the heterogeneous-agent model under the
baseline assumption that G adjusts with respect to labor tax changes.
The first two rows of Table 6 show how equilibrium prices change with respect
to the labor tax rate τl.17 A key finding to note is that the equilibrium wage
decreases with τl, whereas the real interest rate increases with τl. For example,
an increase in τl from 30% to 45% leads the equilibrium wage to fall by 1.2%,
while it leads the interest rate to rise from 4.0% to 4.3%.
Then the question is why a higher τl leads to lower wages and higher interest
rates. As (1) and (2) show that changes in w and r crucially depend on the equi-
librium capital-to-labor ratio (K/L), the bottom three rows of Table 6 report how
key aggregate variables, including K and L, change with respect to τl.18 It shows
that the response of aggregate efficiency unit of labor L has the same sign but is
substantially weaker than that of employment E and aggregate capital stock K.
This implies that a higher τl would decrease K/L, which in turn implies lower w
and higher r.
The finding that changes in L are weaker than other aggregate variables in the
heterogeneous-agent model can be traced to heterogeneous labor supply behavior
across households. In the top panel of Figure 2, I plot how employment rates by
(log) productivity are affected by the labor tax rate changes from 30% to either
15% (dashed line) or 45% (dash–dot line). Note that with respect to such sizeable
labor tax changes, most employment changes are driven by workers with below
median productivity. Since L entails the composition of households with produc-
tivity xi who choose to work, its change can be much dampened compared to E if
the average productivity level of households who change their employment deci-
sion is lower than the average productivity level of workers. This is clearly the
case in Figure 2.
The middle panel of Figure 2 plots the average asset holding choices by (log)
productivity. Unlike employment decisions, households with high productivity
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FIGURE 2. Employment and savings by productivity and the distribution of productivity.
change their savings decision quite substantially. Although highly productive
households stay working in response to higher labor taxes τl, their disposable
labor income declines by a factor of the net-of-tax rate (i.e., 1 − τl). These sub-
stantial saving responses of households with high productivity, who hold a large
fraction of aggregate capital, make the aggregate capital stock to respond strongly
to the labor tax change. This explains why K responds more strongly than L in
Table 6, which is key for understanding why the ratio of capital to labor decreases
with the labor tax rate.
I have so far investigated changes in market-clearing prices with respect to




). As emphasized earlier, the other impor-
tant terms in identifying GE feedback channels are the employment responses
to wages and interest rates (i.e., ∂E
∂w and
∂E
∂r ). Table 7 reports percentage point
changes in employment obtained by changing market prices permanently from
the baseline stationary equilibrium. The first two rows report the effects of wage
changes on employment and show that higher wages lead to moderate increases in
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TABLE 7. Employment changes with respect to factor price changes
Employment changes
By wealth quintile
Unit: pp changes In aggregate First Second Third Fourth Fifth
w = +10% 1.0 2.6 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.1
w = +20% 1.9 6.6 0.8 1.1 0.7 0.1
r = −0.1 pp 1.0 0.0 0.4 1.3 1.3 1.8
r = −0.2 pp 1.9 0.0 0.8 2.3 2.9 3.5
Notes: The reported values are obtained by changing each factor price permanently from the baseline
stationary equilibrium. All reported values are relative to the values from the baseline model before
factor price changes in percentage point changes.
aggregate employment. More interestingly, it also reveals that a lower interest rate
increases aggregate employment quite substantially. For instance, a change in the
real interest rate from 4% to 3.9% induces aggregate employment to rise by 1.0
percentage point, which is quantitatively very similar to the aggregate employ-
ment effect of a 10% wage increase. In other words, a seemingly small change in
the interest rate such as 1 percentage point can be comparable to a quantitatively
sizeable change in aggregate wage such as 10% when it comes to their impact on
aggregate employment.
A closer look reveals that these similar aggregate employment responses are
driven by very different households. Specifically, while wage changes affect the
labor supply decisions of poor households more elastically, it is the rich house-
holds who adjust labor supply more elastically to a change in the interest rate.
A lower real interest rate reduces asset demands (or capital supply), in particu-
lar of the rich households. The resulting negative income effects on labor supply
raise employment, and, in particular, this effect is disproportionately stronger for
the wealth-rich households.
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS USING CROSS-COUNTRY PANEL DATA
The previous section has found that, in the heterogeneous-agent model, GE feed-
back through interest rate changes amplifies the negative employment impact of
higher labor taxes, whereas it is neutral in the representative-agent model. In
small SOEs, the equilibrium interest rate is less tightly linked to domestic cir-
cumstances. Therefore, the employment impact of labor taxes should be weaker
in the SOEs according to the transmission mechanism of the heterogeneous-
agent model, while they should be similar according to the prediction of the
representative-agent model.
To explore this theoretical implication, I construct a cross-country panel data
set combined from different data sources. The key variables are extensive mar-
gin variations and labor tax rates. Data on the extensive margin of labor supply
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are obtained from the Conference Board database “International Comparisons of
Annual Labor Force Statistics,” which covers from 1970 to 2013. In the following
analysis, I present the results using both employment–population ratios and labor
force participation rates. For the other key variable—the labor tax rate, I use the
updated tax data set of McDaniel (2007), which was extended up to 2013 for most
countries in her sample. The key question in this section is concerned with SOEs.
I divide the whole sample into two categories: SOEs and non-SOEs. Specifically,
a country in a certain year is defined as an SOE if the country is both small and
open in that year.19
I begin by plotting the relationship between labor tax rates and labor supply
at the extensive margin in Figure 3. In the left panel, the extensive margin labor
supply is measured by (log) employment–population ratios and, in the right panel,
it is measured by (log) labor force participation rates. Each panel shows their
relationship among SOEs (right) and among non-SOEs (left), separately. First,
note that all four relationships in Figure 3 suggest that a higher labor tax rate is
associated with a lower labor supply at the extensive margin. This is consistent
with the literature that finds that labor taxes are an important determinant of cross-
country differences in total hours worked [Prescott (2004), Ohanian et al. (2008),
and Rogerson (2008) among others].
A more striking and new finding is that this negative relationship is much
weaker among SOEs than non-SOEs in both panels. To investigate this finding
more carefully, consider panel regressions that extend (6). Specifically, I esti-
mate the extensive margin elasticity gap in SOEs relative to non-SOEs using the
following equation:
log Eit = β0 + β1 log(1 − τit) + β2I(soeit) log(1 − τit) + controls + εit, (8)
where I(soeit) is an indicator function which is 1 for SOEs and is 0 otherwise.
Then, β2 would capture an increment of the extensive margin elasticity among
SOEs relative to non-SOEs. If β2 is not different from zero, then one cannot reject
the null hypothesis that the extensive margin elasticity is the same between SOEs
and the others. Note that the main purpose of this regression analysis is not to
identify the unbiased estimates of the extensive margin elasticity but rather to test
if the association between labor tax rates and the extensive margin labor supply
found in Figure 3 is robust. Thus, I include control variables such as country fixed
effects, year fixed effects, and log income per capita (yit). Country fixed effects
can capture various unobservable heterogeneity at the country level. Given the
potential existence of unobserved heterogeneity across countries, the inclusion of
country fixed effects can be preferred in this type of cross-country regressions.
Next, it is useful to include year fixed effects and log income per capita in order
to control for business cycle fluctuations. Note that log income per capita may
also capture overall wage growth, which itself may affect the employment rate.
Table 8 reports the estimation results using both measures of the extensive margin
labor supply. Column (1) does not include any control variables. Columns (2)–(8)
include a different combination of control variables explained above.
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FIGURE 3. Labor taxes and extensive margin labor supply.
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TABLE 8. Extensive margin elasticities in SOEs vs. non-SOEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: log(employment–pop ratio)
β1 0.433 0.478 0.427 0.448 0.466 0.648 0.589 0.514
(0.162) (0.157) (0.192) (0.158) (0.142) (0.193) (0.242) (0.233)
β2 −0.244 −0.225 −0.243 −0.191 −0.289 −0.270 −0.292 −0.230
(0.137) (0.149) (0.146) (0.149) (0.108) (0.097) (0.108) (0.111)
Adjusted R2 0.219 0.291 0.165 0.366 0.852 0.876 0.871 0.886
Dependent variable: log(participation rate)
β1 0.411 0.456 0.437 0.451 0.172 0.357 0.412 0.385
(0.132) (0.132) (0.158) (0.136) (0.140) (0.162) (0.208) (0.205)
β2 −0.243 −0.225 −0.243 −0.252 −0.231 −0.211 −0.247 −0.225
(0.116) (0.124) (0.126) (0.126) (0.105) (0.077) (0.095) (0.091)
Adjusted R2 0.302 0.408 0.266 0.394 0.868 0.907 0.898 0.901
log(yit) No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Country FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 468
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the above estimates, clustered at the country level.
The key results are summarized as follows. First, note that the estimate of β1 is
positive in all specifications (1)–(8) of both tables and is statistically significant
at the 95% confidence level in most specifications with the robust standard errors,
clustered at the country level. This estimate measures the percentage change in
the extensive margin labor supply with respect to a percentage change in the
net-of-tax rate (i.e., the extensive margin labor supply elasticity) in non-SOEs.
Interestingly, the estimate of β1 is quite sizeable, ranging from 0.4 to 0.6 when
the employment–population ratio is used.20
More importantly, the estimate of β2 that captures the increment of the elasticity
for SOEs is negative in all specifications. In both tables, the point estimates are
robustly around −0.25.21 This is economically meaningful, given the magnitude
of the estimate of β1. The above panel regressions with various controls suggest
that the key finding of Figure 3 that the labor tax rates are weakly associated with
the extensive margin labor supply in SOEs is a robust feature of the data. This
supports the heterogeneous-agent model over the representative-agent model, the
former of which highlights equilibrium interest rates as an important amplification
channel through which labor taxes reduce the extensive margin labor supply.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, I have explored the role of GE channels in the employment
effects of labor tax changes. I have found that GE feedback, in particular of
interest rate adjustments, reinforces the negative employment impact of higher
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labor taxes in the heterogeneous-agent model, whereas GE plays no role in the
representative-agent model. A key underlying reason for this is shown to be het-
erogeneous labor supply responses and savings decisions across households in the
heterogeneous-agent model. Using the cross-country panel data, I have found that,
in SOEs, where the equilibrium interest rate is less tightly linked to the domestic
circumstances, the employment effects of labor taxes are much weaker.
The findings in this paper have some important implications. First, the role of
equilibrium interest rates found in this paper implies that the exogenously fixed
interest rate in model economies used to investigate the effects of labor taxes may
not be innocuous. Relatedly, this paper highlights the importance of incorporating
capital markets even when the key object of interest is the effects of labor taxes.
Lastly, this paper provides a counterexample to the conventional view that GE
feedback is a dampening force.
A novel empirical finding in this paper is the difference in the degree of negative
relationship between labor taxes and aggregate employment in SOEs. Although
the key mechanism considered in this paper can be an important underlying source
of this relationship, there could also be alternative explanations for this weaker
negative relationship between labor taxes and the extensive margin labor supply
in SOEs. This interesting exploration is left for future work.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/
10.1017/S1365100519000087.
NOTES
1. For example, it has been at the center of a wide range of macroeconomic analysis since the
seminal work of Prescott (2004), which has demonstrated that differences in labor tax rates can largely
account for the observed cross-country differences in aggregate hours worked. See also Ohanian et al.
(2008) and Rogerson (2008) who further find the important role of tax changes in accounting for
aggregate hours across countries and over time.
2. For instance, the literature has explored the roles of various features that introduce richer het-
erogeneity at the micro level, including life cycles, human capital accumulation, gender differences,
marriage, and labor market frictions. See, for example, Chang and Kim (2006), Krusell et al. (2008,
2010), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008), Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson
(2010), Guner et al. (2012), Chakraborty et al. (2015), Erosa et al. (2016), Karabarbounis (2016), and
Bick and Fuchs-Schündeln (2017) among others.
3. In order to fairly compare the effects of taxes between the heterogeneous-agent model and the
representative-agent model, the exercises control for either transfers or government purchases at the
baseline level in both models.
4. This elasticity is based on steady-state comparison with respect to permanent tax changes while
transfers are held fixed. When transfers adjust, the role of interest rates is still large (increasing it from
0.18 to 0.40). Note that these steady-state elasticities are generally smaller than the intertemporal
elasticity with respect to temporary tax changes (Chetty et al., 2012).
5. Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010) explore the implication of this mechanism for social welfare
and the cross-country differences in average labor productivity. Yum (2018) focuses on the role of
transfers for this mechanism and its implication for the aggregate labor supply elasticity.
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6. These analyses are along the same line as the literature that studies whether heterogeneity mat-
ters for aggregate fluctuations [e.g., Krusell and Smith (1998), Thomas (2002), Chang and Kim (2007),
Khan and Thomas (2008), and Krueger et al. (2016)].
7. Note that G is not the focus of the paper and is assumed to be not valued by households (or
equivalently, it is valued by households in an additively separable manner).
8. Adopting such a utility function for the representative household, the model is essentially a
steady-state version of Hansen (1985) augmented with the government.
9. The heterogeneous-agent model is solved and simulated numerically. The value functions and
the decision rules are stored on 100 grid points for a, which are spaced unevenly, and x with Nx = 50.
The value functions are interpolated using cubic splines. To approximate the distribution μ, I use a
much finer grid (3000 points) over assets. The representative-agent model is solved analytically.
10. This rate is close to the average tax rate and is lower than the US marginal tax rate of 0.4
computed in Prescott (2004). The main results are not sensitive to alternative baseline tax rates around
0.3.
11. Supplementary Appendix provides the detailed description on how transfers related to income
security are measured in the SIPP data.
12. The range of the labor tax rates I consider is ±15 percentage point around the baseline rate
of 30%. The range is broadly in line with cross-country variations of labor taxes in the data set con-
structed by McDaniel (2007). The employment effects are expressed as a percentage change relative
to the benchmark case with τl = 0.3.
13. See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) and Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010).
14. The decomposition is for the baseline case where G adjusts with respect to τl. As noted above,
the decomposition would require feedback from transfers in the case when T adjusts instead.
15. Hence, the mirror image of the solid line corresponds to the first row of Table 4.
16. The numbers in the parentheses show the size of the elasticity relative to the counterpart in the
second row (direct responses).
17. Wage changes are shown in percentage change relative to the baseline case with τl = 0.3 while
interest rate changes are shown in percentage point change.
18. They are expressed in percentage change relative to the case with τl = 0.3.
19. See Supplementary Appendix for details on categorization and data on openness (Chinn and Ito
(2006)).
20. For example, Chetty et al. (2012) obtain 0.25 following Prescott (2004). A key difference herein
is that the estimate of β1 in Table 8 captures the employment effects of net-of-taxes excluding the
SOEs.
21. In particular, it is statistically significant in specifications (5)–(7) using the employment–
population ratio and in specifications (6)–(8) using the labor force participation rate at the 95%
confidence level.
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Krusell, P., T. Mukoyama, R. Rogerson and A. Şahin (2010) Aggregate labor market outcomes: The
roles of choice and chance. Quantitative Economics 1, 97–127.
Krusell, P. and J.-V. Rios-Rull (1999) On the size of US Government: Political economy in the
neoclassical growth model. American Economic Review 89, 1156-1181.
Krusell, P. and A. A. Smith Jr. (1998) Income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy. Journal
of Political Economy 106, 867–896.
Ljungqvist, L. and T. J. Sargent (2008) Taxes, benefits, and careers: Complete versus incomplete
markets. Journal of Monetary Economics 55, 98–125.
McDaniel, C. (2007) Average tax rates on consumption, investment, labor and capital in the OECD
1950-2003. Unpublished Manuscript.
Ohanian, L., A. Raffo and R. Rogerson (2008) Long-term changes in labor supply and taxes: Evidence
from OECD countries, 1956–2004. Journal of Monetary Economics 55, 1353–1362.
Prescott, E. C. (2004) Why do Americans work so much more than Europeans? Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 28, 2–13.
Rogerson, R. (1988) Indivisible labor, lotteries and equilibrium. Journal of Monetary Economics 21,
3–16.
Rogerson, R. (2008) Structural transformation and the deterioration of European labor market
outcomes. Journal of Political Economy 116, 235–259.
Rogerson, R. and J. Wallenius (2009) Micro and macro elasticities in a life cycle model with taxes.
Journal of Economic Theory 144, 2277–2292.
Rouwenhorst, K. G. (1995) Asset pricing implications of equilibrium business cycle models. In:
T. F. Cooley (ed.) Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, pp. 294–330. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Thomas, J. K. (2002) Is lumpy investment relevant for the business cycle? Journal of Political
Economy 110, 508–534.
Trabandt, M. and H. Uhlig (2011) The Laffer curve revisited. Journal of Monetary Economics 58,
305–327.
Yum, M. (2018) On the distribution of wealth and employment. Review of Economic Dynamics 30,
86–105.
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1365100519000087
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 77.190.92.134, on 23 Nov 2020 at 13:38:11, subject to the Cambridge Core
